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Abstract: We experimentally disentangle two potential sources for endogenous social interactions 
effects. By comparing groups where the aggregate behavior is publicly observable with those 
where it is not we can measure the size of any endogenous observation effect. By comparing 
connected with disconnected groups we can measure the size of any endogenous contagion effect. 
Results are provided for both a coordination game and social dilemma. We find strong evidence 
of an endogenous observation effect in the coordination game but not social dilemma. We find no 
evidence of an endogenous contagion effect in either game. While our results point towards a 
conformity effect we argue that information on group behavior primarily acts as a coordinating 
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There is now considerable interest in the interactions based approach to socioeconomic behaviour 
(e.g. Blume and Durlauf 2004; Durlauf and Ioannides 2010). The basic objective is to explore 
group influence on things like effort in the workplace, high school dropout rates, or tax evasion. 
Empirically disentangling group influence is complicated by many problems, most notably, issues 
of identification (Manski 1993, 2000).3 Laboratory experiments enhance the identification of 
endogenous social interactions effects by allowing us to circumvent unobservable contextual and 
correlated effects (Castillo and Carter 2007, Fortin, Lacroix and Villeval 2007, Falk, Fischbacher 
and Gächter 2013). They also allow us to address issues that simply cannot be addressed in the 
field. In particular, Blume et al. (2011) highlight the need to distinguish and disentangle the many 
possible sources of endogenous effect (see also Young 2009) and the lab provides an environment 
to explore such issues. 
 One possible source of endogenous effect is, what we shall refer to as, an observations 
effect. The idea here is that an individual is influenced by what he observes others doing. For 
example, Fred might drop out of school early if he observes friends doing so, or Maria might 
diligently fill in her tax return because she observes her colleagues doing so. Broadly speaking this 
could reflect social preferences or social learning. Fred, for instance, may drop out of school 
because he wants to conform with school friends – social preferences – or because the actions of 
others change his beliefs about the merits of education – social learning (Manski 2000). In a setting 
with little or no strategic interdependence, like school attendance and tax evasion, it seems natural 
to think of the observations effect as the main channel through which endogenous effects may arise 
(e.g. Fortin et al. 2007).4 There is, however, also considerable interest on endogenous social 
interaction effects in settings with higher levels of strategic interdependence.5 In these settings, as 
we shall shortly discuss, alternative effects may come to the fore. 
                                                 
3 While great strides have been made in recent years in overcoming these problems empirical evidence on 
interactions remains controversial (Blume and Durlauf 2006; Graham 2008; Blume et al. 2011). 
4 We informally equate strategic interdependence with a person’s payoff depending on others actions. The returns to 
education and the likelihood of tax audit may depend on the actions of others but the effect of any one person is 
likely to be very small.  
5 Consider, for instance, teenage pregnancy. Pregnancy is a clearly a process that involves two independent decision 
makers with a high degree of strategic interdependence. These two actors make their decisions in a broader social 
environment where they can observe the decisions of friends and family.     
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 The particular example we shall focus on here is that of cooperation with others. Consider, 
for instance, a university where faculty are regularly interacting in small groups on collaborative 
projects through research centres, committees and so on. For the sake of argument suppose, as 
seems reasonable, that the payoff of an academic depends solely on the projects that he is directly 
involved in, rather than the overall performance of the university. How hard will academics work? 
There are clear strategic reasons why the effort of academics within any particular project may 
become homogenous as the group converges to an equilibrium (e.g. Devetag and Ortmann 2007). 
For instance, a person may slack on a project if others are doing so. To speak of an endogenous 
social interactions effect we are interested in spillovers in behaviour across projects.  
To see how this might happen consider Figure 1 in which we compare two universities. In 
University 1 there are four academics, A, B, C and D, and two projects. Academics A and B work 
together and C and D work together. In a benchmark case where A and B cannot observe the effort 
of C and D then there is simply no mechanism whereby the effort of A and B can be influenced 
by the effort of C and D, and vice versa. So, the outcome in each group must be independent. Now, 
suppose that academics A and B can observe the effort of C and D. For instance, they see 
publication or funding outcomes of colleagues. This can result in an observations effect whereby 
the effort of A and B is influenced by what they observe of C and D. Academics A and B may, for 
example, work harder if they observe C and D being successful. This could reflect social 
preferences, such as envy at the success of others, or social learning, such as a change in beliefs 
about the chances of success. As such, it would fit the standard story of an endogenous social 
interactions effect. 
 






University 1 University 2 
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 University 2 still has four academics, A, B, C and D, but now has a more complex 
interaction structure. Specifically, academic A sometimes works with B and sometimes with C 
while academic D works sometimes with C and sometimes with B. Note that A and D do not 
directly interact (neither do B and C) but they do indirectly interact through B and C (or A and D). 
This indirect interaction can lead to a contagion effect (or behavioural cascade) whereby behaviour 
spreads across projects (Fowler and Christakis 2010). For example, academic A may exert high 
effort on a project with B because he recently benefited from exerting high effort on a project with 
C. Note that a contagion effect is independent of an observations effect because it does not require 
that an academic observes the effort of other projects. He simply learns from his own experience 
of working across different projects. Even so, it may still reflect social preferences or social 
learning. Contagion effects have been widely studied in the game theoretic literature on networks 
(e.g. Ellison 2000, Morris 2000, Boyer and Jonard 2014) but received little attention in the 
literature on social interactions.  
Both an observations effect and a contagion effect can lead to endogenous norms. For 
instance, in the university example we may see convergence on similar effort levels across 
different projects. The mechanism through which this happens is, however, very different 
depending on whether the observations or contagion effect is prominent, and this may prove 
important in application (Young 2009). Suppose, for example, a group has converged on an 
inefficient norm of low effort and an employer, department chair or policy maker wants to ‘switch’ 
the group to a more efficient norm. The ease with which this can be done, and the best way to 
achieve it, may critically depend on whether an observations or contagion effect drives behavior. 
An observations effect means that information is of crucial importance. A contagion effect, by 
contrast, means that network structure is crucial (e.g. Keser, Erhart and Berninghaus 1998). Note 
that it may also be important to also discern whether social preferences or social learning are key 
driving factors in whatever effect is observed (Bicchieri 2018).  
In order to disentangle the observation and contagion effect our experiment employs a 2x2 
between-subject design. In groups of four, subjects interact pairwise by playing either a 
coordination game or social dilemma. In the benchmark treatment subjects did not observe and did 
not interact with others in their group. As such, social interaction effects cannot be the cause of 
any correlation in behaviour across the group. Specifically, thinking in terms of University 1, the 
A-B pair and C-D pair never interact in any way and so if they, say, both converge on mutual high 
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effort this cannot be because of spillover effects. In the three remaining treatments subjects 
observed others and/or indirectly interacted with all others in the group. Comparison of outcomes 
in these treatments with our benchmark treatment allows us to directly test for an observations 
and/or contagion effect. Our main finding is of a strong endogenous observations effect in the 
coordination game. This has the effect of significantly increasing cooperation levels. We do not 
find evidence of an observation effect in the social dilemma game. Nor do we find any evidence 
of a contagion effect in either the coordination or social dilemma game. 
We shall relate our work to that of the existing literature as we proceed. But it may help to 
clarify at this stage that our paper fits within two strands of literature. In terms of motivation our 
paper is most closely related to the emerging literature on endogenous social interactions effects 
in the lab (e.g. Fortin et al. 2007, Cooper and Rege 2011, Falk et al. 2013). In terms of design our 
experiment is most closely related to the literature on network games (e,g, Berninghaus, Ehrhart 
and Keser 2002, Cassar 2007, Frey, Corten and Buskens 2012, Antonioni et al. 2013). What 
distinguishes our approach is the way it builds upon both these literatures. In particular, work on 
endogenous social interactions effects has largely ignored the role of contagion, while work on 
network games has largely ignored the role of social influence. Our approach is designed so that 
both effects can be compared. 
In order to justify this latter claim we highlight that allowing for both an observation and 
contagion effect is the main novelty in our approach. To the best of our knowledge, prior studies 
focus on only one of these possibilities. For instance, Fortin et al. (2007), Cooper and Rege (2011) 
and Gächter et al. (2013) consider settings where subjects observe group outcomes but do not 
interact, directly or indirectly, with everyone in the group. By contrast, Berninghaus, Ehrhart and 
Keser (2002), Fowler and Christakis (2010) and Falk et al. (2013) consider settings where subjects 
indirectly interact with everyone in the group but do not observe group outcomes.6 Allowing for 
both observation and contagion effects is a natural next step. Our design allows us to distinguish 
the effect of each. 
We proceed as follows. In sections 2 and 3 we introduce the experimental design, in section 
4 we provide our results and in section 5 we conclude.  
 
                                                 
6 Group here should be read as the extended group with whom players indirectly interact. What Falk et al. (2013) 
call a matching group. We discuss this more in the conclusion. 
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2. Experiment design 
At the beginning of an experimental session subjects were randomly assigned to a group of four 
and given a label A, B, C or D. Over 20 periods the subjects were then matched in pairs (more on 
this shortly) to play the coordination game given in Table 1. The group and labels remained fixed 
throughout the 20 periods. The coordination game played is a version of the minimum effort game 
or stag-hunt where mutual cooperation and mutual non-cooperation are Nash equilibria (Devetag 
and Ortmann 2007).7 We chose this game because the literature on contagion effects has mainly 
focussed on such games (Weidenholzer 2010). Moreover, the existence of multiple equilibria is 
useful in looking for social interaction effects because it suggests there will be heterogeneity in 
behaviour.8   
 
Table 1.  The coordination game and social dilemma game used. 
 
  
Coordination game  
(Part 1: periods 1-20) 
 
Social dilemma 
(Part 2: periods 21-40) 
  Player 2  Player 2 







Cooperate 130, 130 10, 70  100, 100 25, 125 
Not 
cooperate 
70, 10 70, 70  125, 25 50, 50 
 
In addition to a coordination game we also wanted to look at outcomes in a social dilemma. 
So, after 20 periods, subjects were randomly reassigned a new group and label and over a 
subsequent 20 periods were matched to play the social dilemma game given in Table 1.9 This game 
                                                 
7 We can equate cooperation with an effort level of 2 and non-cooperation with an effort level of 1. The payoff of 
member A when matched with member B is 𝜋𝐴 = 10 + 120min{𝑒𝐴, 𝑒𝐵} − 60𝑒𝐴 where 𝑒𝐴 and 𝑒𝐵 are the effort of 
members A and B. 
8 If everyone in the group initially behaves in the same way then there is no realistic hope of picking up a social 
interaction effect. Heterogeneity of behaviour is, therefore, essential. 
9 At the start of the session subjects were only given instructions corresponding to the first part of the experiment 
(they were told there would be a second part to the experiment). After period 20 had finished subjects were given the 
instructions corresponding to the second part of the experiment. In these instructions it was emphasized to subjects 
that they would be playing a different game with a different group of people. Clearly, one cannot rule out the 
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is a version of a linear public good game or Prisoners Dilemma where mutual non-cooperation is 
the unique equilibrium.10 Given that this game has a unique equilibrium (in material payoffs) it is, 
at face value, less interesting for studying social interaction effects. In particular, homogeneity of 
behaviour can be expected for strategic reasons. It has, however, long been recognised that social 
preferences for, say, reciprocity can result in multiple equilibria (e.g. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 
2004). Hence, we may observe social interaction effects (Falk et al. 2013). Indeed, it is plausible 
that social interaction effects could increase the likelihood of mutual cooperation.        
Note that the language used in the instructions was deliberately neutral, using X and Y 
rather than cooperate and non-cooperate. Also, the payoff values for both games were chosen with 
the hope of obtaining around 50 percent cooperation in the first and 21st period (which was indeed 
the case). To obtain 50 percent cooperation is ideal, for our purposes, because it means there is 
maximal heterogeneity of behaviour and therefore considerable potential for social interaction 
effects.   
We ran four treatments employing a 2x2 between subject design in which (1) the network 
of strategic interaction and (2) information on the group norm varied as we now explain.  
The two networks of strategic interaction were: (a) If the group is not-connected then in 
every period member A meets member B and member C meets member D. This corresponds to 
University 1 in Figure 1. (b) If the group is connected then in every odd numbered period member 
A meets member B and member C meets member D, and in every even numbered period member 
A meets member C and member B meets member D. This corresponds to University 2 in Figure 1. 
Irrespective of whether the group is connected or not each group member strategically interacts 
with a strict subset of the group. Member A, for instance, never meets member D. The difference 
between the connected and non-connected group is whether there exists a path of strategic 
interaction between every two group members. In a connected group, for instance, member A 
meets members B and C who each meet member D.  
The two levels of information on group behavior were: (i) If group history is not observable 
then a group member is only given feedback on the outcome of their own strategic interaction. For 
                                                 
possibility of some order effect between parts 1 and 2 of the experiment. We shall return to this issue when 
analyzing the results. 
10 We can equate cooperation with contributing 1 to the public good and non-cooperation with contributing 0. The 
payoff of member A when matched with member B is 𝜋𝐴 = 75(𝑐𝐴 + 𝑐𝐵) + 100(1 − 𝑐𝐴) − 50 where 𝑐𝐴 and 𝑐𝐵 are 
the contributions of members A and B. 
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instance, if member A meets member B then, at the end of the period, he is given feedback on the 
choice of B. (ii) If group history is observable then in each period members of the group were also 
shown a table detailing the number of group members who cooperated and did not-cooperate in 
each period to date.11 Crucially, if history is observable then a group member is exposed to more 
information about the group than when history is not observable (even if the group is connected). 
For instance, if member A meets member B then he directly observes the action of member B and 
can also infer the outcome from member C and Ds interaction. 
In order for the treatments to be comparable the instructions given to subjects were kept 
the same throughout. Specifically, subjects were told that they were in a group of 4 and that they 
would be matched with other members of the group. In each period a subject was then told the 
identity (A, B, C or D) of the member they would interact with in that period. Clearly, subjects 
may realize the pattern as to whom they meet in each period. They cannot be sure, however, that 
this pattern is not going to change.12  
 The experiments took place at the University of Kent in the UK. We had 7 groups for each 
treatment with a total of 112 subjects participating, recruited from across the university. Interaction 
was anonymous by computer. The experiments were programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).  
A session lasted around 40 minutes with the average subject earning £11.10.  
 
3 Hypotheses on endogenous social interaction effects 
Consider group member A (in any of the treatments). Given that members A and B meet there are 
clear strategic reasons why the behaviour of A may be influenced by that of B. For example, 
member A may choose to not cooperate if B has not cooperated in the past. This, of itself, could 
be interpreted as a social interaction effect (see, in particular, Falk et al. 2013). Our interest here, 
however, is on spillover effects that are not a consequence of direct strategic interests. For example, 
we are interested in whether the behaviour of member A may be influenced by member D even 
                                                 
11 We gave information on both cooperation and non-cooperation in order to avoid a framing bias. The sum is 
always four. 
12 The not-connected treatment involves partner matching. The connected treatment is a form of stranger matching. 
We know that cooperation is generally lower in stranger than partner matching (e.g. Duffy and Ochs 2009). Given, 
however, that subjects were given identical instructions and the group has only four members this effect should be 
mitigated. In particular, each interaction takes place at least 10 times. Moreover, subjects were always told the 
identity of the group member they were interacting with and so the ‘stranger’ element is essentially removed.     
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though they never meet. In order to look at this issue we can compare behaviour in A-B and C-D 
pairs. 
In the not-connected and no-history setting there is simply no channel whereby the A-B 
pair can be influenced by the decision in the C-D pair, and vice-versa. This may seem contra to 
the notion of group. It is not unreasonable, however, to imagine members of group who share some 
common identity, e.g. academics at a particular university, while never interacting with each other 
either directly or indirectly. Given that the A-B and C-D pairs are isolated from each other any 
correlation in their behaviour must be due to a contextual or correlated effect.13 The not-connected 
and no-history setting is, thus, the natural benchmark.  
Note that in setting this treatment up as the benchmark we impose no a-priori assumptions 
on what will happen within pairs. Pairs may converge on mutual cooperation, mutual non-
cooperation or otherwise. And behaviour may be driven by strategic material considerations, social 
preferences or otherwise. The key thing for our purposes is that outcomes provide a unit of 
comparison in which we know that observing or indirectly interacting with others cannot be 
relevant. That said, in the ideal world we would see half the pairs exhibit mutual cooperation and 
half mutual non-cooperation. This would allow for maximal baseline heterogeneity at the pair 
level, allowing us to measure spillovers when observation and indirect interaction do take place.    
    Contrast the benchmark setting with the not-connected and history treatment. The chance 
to observe history creates a link between the A-B and C-D pairs. Member A, for example, can infer 
something about the behaviour of members C and D. One could argue that there is no reason for 
member A to be influenced by this information as she only ever strategically interacts with member 
B. This motivates the following null hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1:  In the not-connected and history setting, the decisions of the A-B and C-D pairs are 
independent of each other. 
Hypothesis 1 can be tested by comparing the not-connected and history treatment with the 
benchmark, not-connected and no-history treatment. Any differences between these treatments 
would suggest that behaviour is influenced by observing others. 
                                                 
13 The random assignment of subjects to groups should rule out correlated effects (with a sufficiently large number 
of observations). Contextual effects are possible; for instance, if different sessions are run at different times of the 
day this may change behaviour. Again, however, a random assignment of subjects to treatments should rule this out. 
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We say that there is an observations effect if one group member, say A, is influenced by 
observing the behaviour of group members with whom he does not interact, C and D. Note that an 
observations effect simply cannot happen, by construction, in the not-connected and no-history 
setting. It can happen in the not-connected and history treatment. Rejection of hypothesis 1 would, 
therefore, be consistent with an observations effect. And a positive correlation between pairs would 
be consistent with an endogenous social interactions effect as typically alluded to in the literature 
(Blume and Durlauf 2004). As already said, this could reflect social preferences or social learning. 
There is extensive evidence of peer influence in various contexts (e.g. Falk and Ichino 2006, Shang 
and Croson 2009, Gächter, Nonsenzo and Sefton 2013, Thöni and Gächter 2015) and this may lead 
to an observations effect. It is, however, worth noting that there are contexts where an observations 
effect has not been found (e.g. Fortin et al. 2007). 
 Consider next the connected and no-history setting. In this setting there is a channel of 
strategic interaction whereby the A-B pair can be influenced by the C-D pair, and vice-versa. For 
example, member A’s choice of action when she meets member B may be influenced by the 
experience she had when meeting member C. Members can, however, choose to condition action 
on the member with whom they are interacting (Falk et al. 2013, Berninghaus et al. 2014). Again, 
therefore, one can motivate a null hypothesis of no influence:  
Hypothesis 2:  In the connected and no-history setting, the decisions of the A-B and C-D pairs are 
independent. 
Hypothesis 2 can be tested by comparing the connected and no-history treatment with the 
benchmark, not-connected and no-history treatment. Any differences between these treatments 
would suggest indirect influence through network effects in the group. 
We say that there is a contagion effect if behaviour spreads across the group through 
strategic interaction (e.g. Morris 2000, Cassar 2007, Fowler and Christakis 2010). For instance, 
there is a contagion effect if member A’s behaviour is influenced by the past behaviour of member 
D, because of the effect D’s behaviour has had on B and C. Note that, by construction, a contagion 
effect cannot happen in the two no-connected settings. Rejection of Hypothesis 2 would be 
consistent with an endogenous contagion effect.14 Evidence consistent with a contagion or 
                                                 
14 Contagion is typically defined as the use of an action spreading from a ‘small subset’ of the group to a large 
proportion of the group. Given that we consider groups of four members this definition has to be interpreted loosely 
as meaning the action of one or two members spreading to others in the group.      
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spillover effect has been observed in various settings (e.g. Duflo and Saez 2003, Fowler and 
Christakis 2010). Again, however, it is worth noting that there are examples where a contagion 
effect was not found (e.g. Falk et al. 2013). 
 Finally, consider the connected and history setting. Clearly this setting allows for both an 
observational and strategic channel of influence between A-B and C-D pairs. Our null hypothesis 
remains that these channels do not influence behaviour. 
Hypothesis 3:  In the connected and history setting, the decisions of the A-B and C-D pairs are 
independent. 
There are various alternative hypotheses one could consider here. For instance, if we accept 
hypotheses 1 and 2 but reject hypothesis 3 this would suggest an endogenous social interactions 
effect caused by the interplay between social and strategic interaction. Let us reiterate at this point 
that the key novelty in our approach is an experimental design that allows for both an observation 
and contagion effect and allows us to distinguish between them. 
  
4 Experimental Results 
Figure 2 plots the proportion of subjects choosing cooperation distinguished by treatment. In 
periods 1 and 21 around 50 percent of subjects cooperate and there is no significant difference 
between treatments (p = 0.54, LR test).15 This is exactly as we hoped as there is maximal 
heterogeneity within groups.  
In the coordination game we observe noticeably higher cooperation in the two history 
treatments compared to the no history treatments. This difference is marginally significant by the 
third period (p = 0.09, LR test), highly significant by the fifth period (p < 0.01) and remains 
significant in every subsequent period (p ≤ 0.06). By contrast, there is no apparent difference 
between the two connected treatments and the not-connected treatments (p > 0.1, all periods). In 
the social dilemma game we observe a familiar downward decline in cooperation (Fischbacher and 
Gächter 2010) with no evidence of any significant difference between treatments (p > 0.1, LR test, 
all periods).  
 
                                                 
15 For this test, given that it is the first period, we use the individual as the unit of observation. Unless, otherwise 
specified, all subsequent tests use the group as the unit of observation. All tests are two-sided. 
12 
 
Figure  2: The proportion of subjects who cooperated by treatment in the (a) coordination game 
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Figure  3: The number of subjects choosing the modal group action in the (a) coordination game 






A lack of effect in the aggregate level of cooperation does not, in itself, mean there was no 
correlation of behaviour within groups. Figure 3 plots the number of group members choosing the 
modal action in the group. This can range from two, minimal correlation, to four, maximal 
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coordinate with their match in that period, i.e. mutually choosing to cooperate or mutually 
choosing to not cooperate.  
 
Figure  4: The proportion of subjects who coordinate with their match in that period in the (a) 
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In the coordination game we see a noticeable difference between the history treatments and 
no history treatments in terms of correlation within the group (Figure 3a). This difference is 
significant (p = 0.03, Mann-Whitney) particularly if we look at the final 10 periods (p = 0.002). 16  
There is no difference across treatments in terms of coordination within matches (Figure 4a) with 
coordination increasing over time. Coordination within pairs is to be expected (Devetag and 
Ortmann 2007, Falk et al. 2013). The key issue for us is whether behaviour becomes homogenous 
across the group. In the no history treatments this does not happen. So, we often end up with one 
pair who mutually cooperate and another who do not cooperate (Figure 3a). This is evidence 
against a contagion effect.17 By contrast, in the history treatments we observe increased 
homogeneity within the group. This is evidence of an observations effect.  
If we turn our attention to the social dilemma then we see both increased correlation within 
the group (Figure 3b) and coordination within pairs (Figure 4b). There are no significant 
differences between treatments (p > 0.1). The increased correlation within groups could be seen 
as evidence as social interaction effects (see, in particular, Fowler and Christakis 2010). Again, 
however, there is no evidence of either a contagion or observations effect. Instead, we appear to 
simply be picking up a convergence towards non-cooperation. In particular, we observe high 
correlation across the group even in the benchmark treatment. 
It is apparent in Figure 3 that correlation within the group evolves over the 40 periods. 
Figure 5 provides details on respective group outcomes in the final period, period 20 and 40.18 In 
the coordination game we again see a noticeable difference between the history treatments and the 
no-history treatments. In the history treatments, for instance, over 40 percent of the groups have 
all members cooperating, while in the no history treatments the proportion drops to zero percent 
(p = 0.02, LR test).  Interestingly, however, the proportion of times we observe one pair cooperate 
and the other non-cooperate is not significantly different across treatments (p = 0.12). We observe, 
therefore, more instances of maximum correlation in the history treatments, but not significantly 
                                                 
16 There is no significance difference between the two connected treatments and the not-connected treatments, even 
in the final 10 periods (p > 0.1). To be more specific: There is no significant difference in the final 10 periods 
between the connected and history and not-connected and history treatments (p = 0.30, Mann-Whitney). The 
differences between the not-connected, history and no history treatments (p = 0.05) and the connected, history and 
no history treatments (p = 0.01) are significant. 
17 The fact that we obtain groups with one pair who cooperate and another who do not cooperate means that there 
was potential for a contagion effect to appear. 
18 We did not observe any significant end game effect and so the picture remains the same in proceeding periods. 
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more instances of zero correlation. We shall return to this point shortly. In the social dilemma 
game there are no significant differences between treatments.  
Recall that all subjects played the social dilemma after playing the coordination game (with 
a different group). This raises the question of whether the differences we observe between the 
coordination game and social dilemma reflect an order effect. There are two reasons that we think 
our results are not being driven by an order effect. First, the cooperation level we obtain in the 
social dilemma is very similar to that observed in other studies (Fischbacher and Gächter 2010, 
Fowler and Christakis 2010). Second, it seems hard to argue that an order effect would result in 
no difference in part 2 of the experiment.19 We would argue, therefore, that there is some 
systematic reason why we observe an observations effect in the coordination game but not social 
dilemma. Is to such issues we now turn. 
 
Figure 5. Group outcomes in the final period of the coordination game and social dilemma, 
distinguishing between all four cooperating (all cooperate), one pair of mutual cooperation and 




                                                 
19 It would be much harder, for instance, to rule out an order effect if we observed an observations effect in the 
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4.1 Contagion effect 
The lack of a contagion effect suggests that a subject, in a connected treatment, must adapt choice 
relative to the current match. That is, cooperating with one group member and not-cooperating 
with another. This is something that Berninghaus, Neumann and Vogt (2014) refer to as a mixed 
strategy. In order to more formally look for evidence of a mixed strategy, let 𝑐𝑖
𝑡 ∈ {0,1} denote 
whether subject 𝑖 cooperated in period 𝑡, where 𝑐𝑖
𝑡 = 1 indicates that the subject cooperated and 
𝑐𝑖
𝑡 = 0 that he or she did not. The value ∆𝑖
𝑡= 𝑐𝑖
𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖
𝑡−1 tells us how subject 𝑖 changes behaviour 
between periods 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 1. For example, if the subject does not cooperate in period 11 and 
cooperates in period 12 then ∆𝑖
12= 1. Let 𝑐−𝑖
𝑡 ∈ {0,1} denote whether the match of subject 𝑖 
cooperated in period 𝑡 and let ∆−𝑖
𝑡 = 𝑐−𝑖
𝑡 − 𝑐−𝑖
𝑡−1 denote the change in behaviour. For example, if a 
subject’s match did not cooperate in period 9 and cooperated in period 10 then ∆−𝑖
10= 1. 
 Consider the connected treatments. A mixed strategy would suggest a positive correlation 
between ∆𝑖
𝑡 and ∆𝑖
𝑡−2. To explain this point, suppose that subject 𝑖 was group member A and ∆𝑖
12=
1 and ∆−𝑖
10= 1. Then subject 𝑖 did not cooperate in period 11 when interacting with member B and 
cooperated in period 12 when interacting with member C. This fits with the behaviour subject 𝑖 
last experienced when interacting with these group members - member B not cooperating in period 
9 and member C cooperating in period 10. Figure 6 plots ∆𝑖
𝑡 against ∆−𝑖
𝑡  with the radius of the 
circle measuring the proportion of observations of each type. In the connected treatments we see 
a positive relationship between differences in own choice and others choice for both the 
coordination game and social dilemma. This is evidenced by a higher proportion of (−1,−1) and 
(1, 1) pairs compared to (−1, 1) and (1, −1) pairs. These differences are highly significant (p < 
0.01, LR test) and evidence of a mixed strategy.  
For comparison we also plot the data for the not-connected treatments where, as expected, 
there is no correlation between ∆𝑖
𝑡 and ∆−𝑖
𝑡 . Also worth comment, is that in the connected treatments 
a sizable proportion of subjects choose the same action against both other group members (see the 
large number of (−1, 0) and (1, 0) pairs). This is not evidence of a contagion effect, even in the 
coordination game, because it may reflect a subject’s expectation that others will change action.20 
 
                                                 
20 If member A cooperates and member B non-cooperates then only one of them needs to change choice in order to 
coordinate next time around.   
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Figure 6: Correlation between own cooperation and previous opponent’s cooperation in odd and 
even periods. The size of the circle measures the proportion of observations of this type.  
 
(a) Connected treatments, coordination game (left) and social dilemma (right) 
 
(b) Not-connected treatments, coordination game (left) and social dilemma (right) 
 
4.2 Observation effect 
As we have discussed an observations effect can broadly represent social preferences or social 
learning. The differences we observe between the coordination game and social dilemma, coupled 
with a lack of contagion effect, suggest that social learning is the more likely factor in our 
experiment. In particular, the willingness of subjects to condition action on the current opponent 
is evidence of relatively strategic behavior. Observing others may, therefore, have acted as a kind 
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of ‘sun spot’ that facilitated coordination through a convergence in beliefs. This clearly points 
more towards social learning than social preferences. To explain the point we provide an example. 
Consider, first, a not-connected treatment and suppose the A-B pair mutually cooperate 
while member C cooperates and member D does not cooperate. If history is not observable then 
members C and D cannot see the mutual cooperation in the A-B pair. Ultimately, the C-D pair will 
likely coordinate but it is unclear whether they will coordinate on the efficient or inefficient 
equilibrium. Suppose now that history is observable. In this case member’s C and D can see the 
mutual cooperation in the A-B pair. Intuitively, this makes it more likely the C-D pair will 
coordinate on mutual cooperation. The A-B pair provides ‘an example’ to follow. Moreover, the 
cooperation of the A-B pair provides a focal piece of information to aid coordination of the C-D 
pair. In particular, it may change the beliefs of member D on the likelihood of achieving mutual 
cooperation. 
That observing others can serve as a focal point is consistent (recall Figure 4) with the fact 
that subjects were no more likely to coordinate in the history treatments compared to the no-history 
treatments, they were just more likely to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium. To provide some 
more direct evidence see Figure 7. This details the proportion of groups in which the level of 
cooperation stays the same or increases from one period to the next. Of key importance is what 
happens if there are three group members cooperating in the coordination game. Consistent with 
the story of the previous paragraph, it is significantly more likely that there will be a weak increase 
in cooperation in a history compared to a no-history treatment (p = 0.03, LR test). A similar effect 
is also seen in the social dilemma, although this effect is statistically insignificant (p = 0.21). 
In the case where two group members cooperate we observe no significant difference 
between the history and no-history treatments (p > 0.1). This is as we would expect. More 
interesting is the case where one group member cooperates. Somewhat surprisingly, it is more 
likely that there will be an increase in cooperation in the history compared to no-history treatments 
(p = 0.08, LR test). Given that it was relatively rare to see only one cooperator we have too few 
observations to decompose why this was the case. We can say, however, that across treatments, 
the unique cooperator typically remained a cooperator in the subsequent period. Moreover, the 
difference we observe in Figure 7 is driven by the connected and history treatment where a player 
has an incentive to take note of what happened in the other pair (because he will be matched with 




Figure 7: The proportion of times where the level of cooperation in the group stays the same or 
increases from one period to the next conditional on the number initially cooperating. 
(a) Coordination game    
 
(b) Social dilemma    
 
 
In summary, the choices we observe in the coordination game are consistent with strategic 
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as a ‘sun spot’ around which to coordinate through convergence of beliefs. This can explain the 
higher levels of coordination and cooperation we observed in the history treatments. It also can 
explain why we found no observations effect in the social dilemma. More specifically, the choices 
we observe in the social dilemma are also consistent with strategic behavior but merely result in a 
familiar convergence on the dominant strategy of non-cooperation. This interpretation of the 
observations effect suggests social learning, rather than something social preferences, is causing 
the effect. We would argue, however, that this is still an endogenous social interactions effect.  
 
5.  Discussion 
In this paper we have reported on an experiment designed to disentangle two possible sources of 
endogenous social interactions effect. The distinction is made between an observations effect, 
which comes from observing others over time, and a contagion effect, which comes from indirectly 
interacting with others over time. We find no evidence of a contagion effect. We find strong 
evidence of an observation effect in a coordination game, but not a social dilemma. 
 The absence of any contagion effect is consistent with the results of Falk et al. (2013) and 
Berninghaus, Neumann and Vogt (2014). They also observe subjects choosing a different action 
depending on the opponent, meaning little spillover from one interaction to another.21 We highlight 
that this lack of spillover has important implications for the interpretation of results, both 
theoretical and experimental, on learning across networks (e.g. Morris 2000, Berninghaus et al. 
2002, Cassar 2007). The literature typically assumes (or in the experimental context, forces) an 
individual to choose the same action in all interactions. Spillovers are thus exogenously imposed 
making some form of contagion effect inevitable. The generality of this assumption and the 
associated results may need rethinking if spillovers are not common in practice. 
We have treated the lack of a spillover effect as evidence against a contagion effect. It is, 
therefore, important to clarify that subjects adapting their behaviour to that of an opponent can 
also be taken as evidence of an endogenous social interactions effect. This is the interpretation 
Falk et al. (2013) use in analyzing their results. This distinction largely comes from how one 
defines the group. Our approach considers pair-wise interactions within a group of four. The group 
                                                 
21 Bednar et al. (2012) do find a spillover effect from one game to another but in this case a subject is playing two 




is thus ‘larger’ than any game played. By contrast, Falk et al. (2013) equate group with game and 
so see a person as simultaneously interacting with two different groups.22 Given that social 
interactions effects are typically motivated by the idea people conform to behaviour within the 
group (Blume et al. 2004) this distinction is not innocuous.  
The results of Falk et al. (2013) show that people can be influenced by those with whom 
they directly interact. This is understandable through strategic motives, even if those motives may 
reflect social preferences such as reciprocity or inequity aversion (Gäcther et al. 2013). Our 
findings are consistent with those of Falk et al. (2013) in this regard. In understanding social 
interactions effects, though, it seems particularly important to question whether people are 
influenced by those with whom they do not directly interact. In order to address this question 
subjects need exposure, as some did in our experiment, to what is going on in a more broadly 
defined group. This is the approach typical in the literature looking at peer effects (e.g. Fortin et 
al. 2007, Gächter et al 2013).23   
Given that we have strong evidence for an observations effect we see that subjects can be 
influenced by others in the group. We have suggested, however, that information about others 
served a relatively strategic purpose in helping facilitate coordination. There was no evidence of 
‘blind’ conformity to group norms. In this regard our findings are consistent with prior results. 
Cooper and Rege (2011), for instance, find evidence of endogenous effects but put this down to 
social regret rather than social learning or conformity. Similarly, Gächter, Nonsenzo and Sefton 
(2013) find evidence consistent with social preferences rather than conformity to social norms. 
See also Fortin et al. (2007) who find that evidence of endogenous interaction effects disappears 
in their data once an appropriate empirical strategy is used. 
Recall that our basic objective in this paper was to distinguish different possible sources of 
endogenous effect. Our results, coupled with those in the literature that we have just mentioned, 
suggest they are not driven by contagion or conformity. This is not to deny endogenous effects 
exist; we clearly observed endogenous effects in our data. It does though suggest the extent of 
endogenous social interactions effects in the general population may be overstated or the causes 
of any effects misattributed. For instance, the highly correlated behavior we observed in the social 
                                                 
22 Falk et al (2013) consider a ‘population’ of nine people. Each person in that population plays in two distinct three 
player games with a total of four different people. One can think of the group as the nine people in the population or 
as the three people in any one game.  
23 See also Blume et al. (2011) who discuss the importance and difficulty of describing ‘group’. 
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dilemma is most easily explained as an exogenous effect. Our experimental design allows us to 
rule out an endogenous contagion effect (Fowler and Christakis 2010). 
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